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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE OF ALASKA,
by Attomey General Bruce M. Botelho
Consumer Protection/Antitrust Unit
1031 West Fourth Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage, AK 99501;

)
)
)
)
)
)
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
)
by Attomey General Mark Pryor
)
200 Tower Building
)
323 Center Street
)
Little Rock, AR 72201-2601;
)
)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
)
by Attomey General Bill Lockyer
)
300 South Spring St., Suite 5000
)
Los Angeles, CA 90013;
)
)
STATE OF COLORADO,
)
by Attomey General Ken Salazar
)
1525 Sherman Street, Fifth Floor
)
Denver. CO 80203;
)
)
STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
)
by Attomey General Richard Blumenthal
)
.Antitrust Department
)
110 Sherman Street
)
Hartford. CT 06105;
)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
)
by Corporation Counsel John M. Ferren
)
441 4th Street, N.W.
)
Washington, D.C. 20001;
)
)
STATE OF FLORIDA,
)
by Attomey General Robert A. Butterworth )
Antitrust Section
)
PL-01. The Capitol
)
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050;
)
)

SECOND AMENDED CO M PLA IN T
AND DEMAND FO R JU R Y TR IA L

CASENUMBER: L98CV03115
JUDGE; Thomas F. Hogan

•

STATE OF IDAHO,
by Attorney General Alan G. Lance
Consumer Protection Unit
700 W. Jefferson Street, Room 210
Boise, ID 83720-0010;

STATE OF IOWA,
by Attorney General Thomas J. Miller
Iowa Department of Justice
1300 E. Walnut
Des Moines, IA 50319;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
by Attorney General
Albert Benjamin Chandler EH
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40602-2000;

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF ILLINOIS,
by Attorney General James E. Ryan
Antitrust Bureau
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, IL 60601;

STATE OF MAINE
by Attorney General Andrew Ketterer
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF MARYLAND
by Attorney General
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Antitrust Division
200 St. Paul Street
Baltimore, MD 21202;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF LOUISIANA,
by Attorney General Richard P. Ieyoub
301 Main Street, Suite 1250
Baton Rouge, LA 70804;
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STATE OF MICHIGAN,
by Attorney General '
Jennifer M. Granholm
Consumer Protection Division
.Antitrust and Franchise Section
670 G. Mennen Williams Building
525 W Ottawa Street
P . O . B o x 30213
Lansine, MI 48913;
STATE OF MINNESOTA,**
by Attorney General Mike Hatch
Antitrust and Commerce Division
N.C.L. Tower, Suite 1200
445 Minnesota Street
St. Paul. MN 55101;
STATE OF MISSOURI
by Attorney General
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon
Consumer Protection Division
111 North Seventh Street
Suite 204
St. Louis, MO 63101;
STATE OF NEW MEXICO.
by Attorney Generai Patricia A. Madrid
.Antitrust Unit
□301 Indian Schooi Road. Suite 400
.Albuauerque. NM 87110;
STATE OF NEW YORK, **
by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
.Antitrust Bureau
120 Broadway, Suite 26-01
New York, NY 10271;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

* Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), the caption in this action should be changed to reflect the election of Mike Hatch to the office of
Attorney General of the State of Minnesota.
** Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). the capuon in this action should be changed to reflect the election of Eliot Spitzer to the Office of
the Attorney General o f the State of New York

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
by Attorney General Michael F. Easley
Consumer Protection/Antitrust Section
114 W. Edenton Street
P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602;

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF OHIO,
by Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery
Antitrust Section
140 East Town Street, 1st Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215;

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
by Attorney General
W. A. Drew Edmondson
4545 N. Lincoln Boulevard
Suite 260
Oklahoma City, OK 73105;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF OREGON
by Attorney General Hardy Myers
Department o f Justice
Justice Building
1162 Court Street NE, Suite 100
Salem. OR 97310;
*

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
by Attorney General D. Michaei Fisher
)
.Antitrust Section
)
14th Floor, Strawberry Square
)
Harrisburg, PA 17120;
)
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
by Attorney General Charles M. Condon
Rembert C. Dennis Building
1000 Assembly Street, Suite 501
Columbia, SC 29211-1549;
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
by Attorney General Mark Barnett
¿00 East Capitol
Pierre, SD 57501-5070;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF TENNESSEE,
by Attorney General and Reporter
Paul G. Summers
.Antitrust Division
425 5th Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243;

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF TEXAS,
by Attorney General John Comyn
Office o f the Attorney General
300 W. 15th Street, 9th Floor
Austin, TX 78711-2548;'

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,
by Attorney General Jan Graham
.Antitrust Section
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872;

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF VERMONT,
bv Attorney General William H. Sorrell
.Antitrust and Consumer Fraud Unit
109 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05609-1001:

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF WASHINGTON
by Attorney General Christine O. Gregoire
.Antitrust Section
r00 Fourth Avenue. Suite 2000
Seattle. WA 98164-1012;

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
by Attorney General Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.
Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division
812 Quarrier Street
Charleston, WV 25301;
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
by Attorney General James E. Doyle
.Antitrust Unit
123 West Washington Avenue
Madison, WI 53703-7857;
Plaintiffs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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)
)
)
MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC.,
)
130 Seventh Street,
)
1030 Century Building,
)
Pittsbureh, Pennsylvania 15222;
)
)
CAMBREX CORPORATION,
)
One Meadowlands Plaza
)
East Rutherford, New Jersey 07073;
)
)
PROFARMACO S.RL.
)
Via Cucchiari, 17
)
1-20155 Milano, Italy;
)
)
GYMA LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC.,)
135 Cantiague Rock Road,
)
Westbury, New York IT 590;
)
)
SST CORPORATION,
)
635 Brighton Road,
)
Clifton, New Jersey 07015,
)
)
Defendants.
)
V.

_________________________________________________________ )

I.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
1.

The States of Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado. Connecticut, Flo.rida, Idaho,

Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma. Oregon. South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont. Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin; the Commonwealths o f Kentucky and
Pennsylvania; and the District of Columbia (collectively, Plaintiff States or States), by and through
their Attorneys General, bring this action as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons in their
respective States; on behalf of their respective States’ general economies in their sovereign capacities;
6

and/or in their proprietary capacities on behalf o f departments, bureaus and agencies of state
40

government as injured purchasers or reimbursers, against Defendants Mylan Laboratories. Inc.
(Mylan), Cambrex Corporation (Cambrex), Profarmaco S.r.l. (Profarmaco), Gyma Laboratories of
.America. Inc. (Gyma), and SST Corporation (SST) (collectively, Defendants).
2.

The States seek relief to remedy and compensate for injuries sustained as a result o f

* the Defendants’ violations of the antitrust laws o f the United States and related laws o f the States.
The States allege Defendants Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco and Gyma: 1) conspired to monopolize
the markets for generic lorazépam tablets and generic clorazepate tablets; and 2) entered into
unlawful contracts, combinations and conspiracies relating to the supply o f the active pharmaceutical
ingredients (APIs) for clorazepate and lorazépam in unreasonable restraint o f trade. The States
further allege Defendant Mylan attempted to monopolize and did in fact unlawfully monopolize the
markets for generic lorazépam and generic clorazepate tablets. The States also allege Defendants
Mylan. Cambrex, Profarmaco. Gyma and SST conspired and agreed to fix, raise, or stabilize the
prices orlorazepam API. Finally, the States allege supplemental state law claims.
II.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

This Complaint, which alleges violations o f Sections 1 and 2 o f the Sherman Act, 15

U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, is filed under and jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Sections 4, 4c. 12
and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15c, 22 and 26, and 28 U.S.C. §1331.
4.

This Complaint also alleges violations of state antitrust and/or unfair competition

statutes and related state laws as set forth in Paragraphs 89 through 167 below, and seeks damages,
civil penalties and/or equitable relief under those state laws for claims brought by the following
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States:

Alaska, Arkansas, California Colorado, Connecticut, Florida Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,

Louisiana Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia Wisconsin; the Commonwealths o f Kentucky and
Pennsylvania; and the District of Columbia. All claims under federal and state law are based upon
a common nucleus of operative facts and the entire action commenced by this Complaint constitutes
a single case which would ordinarily be tried in one judicial proceeding.
5.

This Court has jurisdiction o f the action under the provisions o f 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1337 and 1367(a), as well as under the principles o f supplemental jurisdiction.

Supplemental

jurisdiction would avoid unnecessary duplication and multiplicity o f actions in law and in equity, and
should be exercised in the interests o f judicial economy, convenience and fairness.
6.

Venue is proper in this district under Section 12 o f the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22

and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) and (d). At all times relevant to the bringing ofthis action, Defendants
transacted business, did business, were found or resided in the District o f Columbia or because the
claims alleged arose, in part, in this judicial district. In addition, as to defendant Profarmaco. venue
is proper pursuant 15 U.S.C. § 1391(d).
III.
THE PARTIES
7.

The States bring this action by and through their Attorneys General, as parens patriae

on behalf o f natural persons; on behalf o f their respective States’ general economies in their sovereign
capacities; and/or in their proprietary capacities on behalf o f departments, bureaus and agencies of
state government, as injured purchasers (direct, indirect, or as assignees) or as reimbursers under state
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Medicaid and other programs.
8.

Defendant Mylan is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and

by virtue of the laws of Pennsylvania. Mylan’s office and principal place o f business is located at 1>0
Seventh Street, 1030 Century Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222. Mylan is engaged in the
business of developing, licensing, manufacturing, marketing, and distributing generic and proprietary
pharmaceutical and wound care products, including at least 91 generic drugs. In the twelve months
ending March 31, 1998, Mylan had revenues o f $555.4 million and net income o f $100.7 million.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Mylan Laboratories, is one o f the world’s
largest generic drug companies. Mylan Pharmaceuticals is located at 781 Chestnut Ridge Road, P.O.
Box 4310, Morgantown, West Virginia 26504-4310. Mylan Laboratories has ultimate control over
the activities o f Mylan Pharmaceuticals. Upon information and belief. UDL Laboratories, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Mylan Laboratories, specializes in packaging technology and produces
unit dose multi-source pharmaceuticals. UDL Laboratories is located in Loves Park, Illinois, and its
mailing address is P.O. Box 2629. Loves Park, Illinois 61132-2629. Upon information and belief,
at all relevant times. Mylan Laboratories has had ultimate control over the activities of UDL
Laboratories.
9.

Defendant Cambrex is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and

by virtue o f the laws o f Delaware. Cambrex’s office and principal place o f business are located at
One Meadowlands Plaza, East Rutherford. New Jersey 07073. Cambrex is engaged in the business
of manufacturing and selling chemicals for pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, agriculture, and other
industrial uses. In 1997, Cambrex had revenues o f $380 million and net income o f $17.8 million.
Cbm Technologies, Inc. (Cbm) is a subsidiary o f Cambrex located at 1 East First Street, Reno,
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Nevada 89501. Upon information and belief. Cbm was the primary contracting party, on behalf o f
Cambrex, in the exclusive licensing arrangements with Mylan described below. Upon information
and belief, at all relevant times, Cambrex has had ultimate control over the activities o f Cbm.
10.

Defendant Profarmaco S.r.l., a wholly owned subsidiary o f Cambrex, is based in

Milan, Italy and is located at Via Cucchiari, 7, 1-20155, Milano, Italy. Profarmaco is engaged in the
business of manufacturing chemicals, including APIs, and selling them to drug manufacturers in the
United States and elsewhere. The API, which is the chemical that allows the drug to affect the body,
is the most essential raw material for a pharmaceutical product. Upon information and belief, at all
relevant times, Cambrex has had ultimate control over the activities of Profarmaco.
11.

Defendant Gyma is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and

by virtue o f the laws of New York. Gyma’s office and principal place of business is located at 135
Cantiague Rock Road, Westbury, New York 11590. Gyma is engaged in the business o f selling APIs
and other chemicals to the pharmaceutical industry. In 1997, Gyma had sales o f approximately $91
million.

Gyma buys APIs from Profarmaco and other firms and resells them to generic drug

manufacturers in the United States.
12.

Defendant SST is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by

virtue of the laws o f New Jersey. SST’s office and principal place o f businesses located at 635
Brighton Road, Clifton, New Jersey 07015. SST is engaged in the business o f selling APIs and other
chemicals to the pharmaceutical industry. SST buys APIs from Fabricca Italiana Sintetici SpA (FIS)
and other firms and resells them to generic drug manufacturers in the United States.
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IV.
CO-CONSPIRATORS
13.

Upon information and belief, other persons, firms, corporations and entities not named

as Defendants herein have participated as co-conspirators with the Defendants in the violations
alleged in this Complaint, and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance thereof.
V.
THE GENERIC DRUG INDUSTRY
14.

Generic drugs, which are chemically identical versions o f branded drugs, cannot be

marketed until after the patent on the branded drug has expired. Firms that manufacture and market
generic drugs often specialize in such drugs, although Mylan manufactures both generic and branded
drugs. Generic drugs typically are sold at substantial discounts from the price o f branded drugs.
15.

Mylan and other generic drug manufacturers require the approval o f the United States

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic product in the United States. For each
generic drug, the manufacturer must file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the
FDA to establish that its version of the drug is therapeutically equivalent to the branded drug. FDA
approval o f an ANDA takes an average of about 18 months, although the approval process can take
two years or more.
16.

Typically, the generic manufacturer purchases the API from a specialty chemical

manufacturer (API supplier). The generic manufacturer combines the API with inactive fillers,
binders, colorings, and other chemicals to produce a finished product.
17.

To sell an API in the United States, the API supplier must file a Drug Master File

(DMF) with the FDA. The DMF explains the processes that the API supplier uses to make the API

n

and to test chemical equivalence and bioequivalence to the brand product. To use an API, the generic
manufacturer’s AND A must refer to the API supplier’s DMF filed with the FDA. More than one
drug manufacturer can reference the DMF of the same API supplier. A generic manufacturer that
wants or needs to change its API supplier must obtain FDA approval o f an AND A supplement, which
includes a reference to the new supplier’s DMF and test results regarding the generic manufacturer’s
product using the new API. This process can take as long as three years, with an average o f about
eighteen months.
18.

Lorazepam and ciorazepate are two o f the approximately 91 generic drugs that Mylan

currently manufactures and sells in tablet form. Lorazepam is used to treat anxiety, tension, agitation,
and insomnia, and as a preoperative sedative. Doctors issue over 18 million prescriptions a year for
lorazepam tablets. Because lorazepam is used to treat chronic conditions and is heavily prescribed
for nursing home and hospice patients, lorazepam users tend to stay on the drug for long periods of
time. Ciorazepate is used to treat anxiety as well as hypertension, and in adjunct therapy for nicotine
and opiate withdrawal. Doctors issue over three million prescriptions a year for ciorazepate tablets.
19.

Profarmaco and FIS both manufacture APIs in Italy. Both'nompanies hold DMFs for

lorazepam API and ciorazepate API, and have supplied such APIs to drug manufacturers in the
United States. Foreign firms, like Profarmaco and FIS, that supply APIs to the United States
typically have distributors in the United States who purchase APIs and resell them to generic drug
manufacturers in the United States. Mylan purchases its lorazepam and ciorazepate API from Gyma,
Profarmaco’s United States distributor o f these products. Several other generic drug manufacturers
have purchased lorazepam API from SST, FIS’s United States distributor o f this product. Mylan has
never purchased FIS’s lorazepam .API from SST because FIS is not an approved lorazepam supplier
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for Mylan, —i.e., Mylan’s ANDA does not reference FIS’s DMF.
VI.
TRADE AND COMMERCE
20.

At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco,

Gyma and SST participated in the market for generic pharmaceuticals throughout the United States.
21.

Defendant Mylan manufactured, marketed, sold and distributed generic pharmaceutical

products throughout the United States. Mylan’s products were transported across state lines and
were sold in the various states. The products sold and distributed by Defendant Mylan were shipped
in interstate commerce.
22.

Defendant Gyma is engaged in the business o f selling APIs and other chemicals to the

pharmaceutical industry. Gyma buys APIs from Profarmaco and other firms and resells them to
generic drug manufacturers in the United States.
23.

Defendant SST is engaged in the business o f selling APIs and other chemicals to the

pharmaceutical industry. SST buys APIs from FIS and other firms and resells them to generic drug
manufacturers in the United States.
24.

Defendant Profarmaco is engaged in the business of manufacturing chemicals,

including APIs, and selling them to drug manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere.
2 5.

Defendant Cambrex is engaged in the business o f manufacturing and selling chemicals

for pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, agriculture, and other industrial uses.
26.

The activities of the Defendants, including manufacturing, marketing, distributing and

selling pharmaceutical products, were in the regular, continuous and substantial flow o f interstate
commerce and have had and continue to have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.
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VII.
RELEVANT MARKETS
27.

There are four relevant markets:

(1) the market for generic lorazepam tablets

approved for sale in the United States; (2) the market for generic clorazepate tablets approved for
sale in the United States; (3) the market for lorazepam API approved for sale in the United States;
and (4) the market for clorazepate API approved for sale in the United States.
VIII.
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
28.

In 1997, Mylan embarked on a strategy to raise the prices o f some of its generic drugs

and maintain these prices at inflated levels, thereby increasing the profitability o f these drugs. One
part of this strategy was to seek from its API suppliers long-term exclusive licenses for the DMFs o f
certain APIs selected by Mylan because of limited competition. If Mylan obtained such an exclusive
license, no other generic drug manufacturer could use that supplier’s API to make the drug in the
United States.
29.

Ultimately, Mylan sought exclusive licenses for the DMFs for lorazepam API and

clorazepate API.
30.

Mylan began negotiating for exclusive licenses with Profarmaco and its distributor

Gyma, which sold lorazepam and clorazepate APIs to Mylan. The parties negotiated at meetings in
Bologna Italy; in London; and in New York. These negotiations concerned Mylan’s proposal to
Profarmaco that Profarmaco license exclusively to Mylan, for ten years, Profarmaco’s DMFs for
lorazepam and clorazepate API. The exclusive licenses would provide Mylan complete control over
Profarmaco’s entire supply o f lorazepam and clorazepate API entering the United States market.
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31.

Prior to these negotiations, Gyma sold Profarmaco ’s lorazepam API to Mylan, Watson

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Watson), and Purepac, a subsidiary o f Faulding, Inc. (Purepac), and its
clorazepate API to Mylan and Watson. Purepac and Watson are generic drug producers that
compete with Mylan.

At this time, Profarmaco (through Gyma) was the only source selling

lorazepam and clorazepate API to generic manufacturers in the United States. FIS, which previously
had supplied the United States market with lorazepam API, recently had exited the market because
it no longer had any customers. With complete control o f Profarmaco :s supply o f these products,
and by refusing to sell any to its competitors, Mylan could deny its competitors access to the most
important ingredient for producing lorazepam and clorazepate tablets.
32.

In return for the ten year exclusive licenses, Mylan offered to pay Cambrex,

Profarmaco, and Gyma a percent of its gross profits on its sales o f lorazepam and clorazepate tablets,
regardless o f whether Mylan purchased the API from Profarmaco through Gyma. The profit sharing
percentage offered by Mylan was smaller for lorazepam than clorazepate. As Mylan explained to
Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma. the reason for this difference was that Mylan intended to seek a
similar exclusive agreement on iorazepam API with FIS, a competitor of Profarmaco, and with FIS’s
distributor, SST. Under this proposed agreement, Mylan would also pay FIS and SST a certain
percent of Mylan's gross profits on lorazepam tablets, even though Mylan could not utilize FIS
lorazepam API due to FDA regulations.
33.

In October 1997. Mylan approached SST, FIS’s distributor o f lorazepam API in the

United States, regarding a possible second exclusive licensing agreement for lorazepam API. The
intent of this approach was to deny Mylan’s competitors an alternate source of lorazepam API.
Because o f FDA regulations which require a manufacturer’s ANDA to reference the DMF of its
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supplier, Mylan could not even use FIS’s lorazepam API. Before Mylan could use FIS’s product,
it was required to supplement its AND A, which could take an average o f 18 months. Mylan
explained to SST that it intended to raise the price of lorazepam tablets by controlling the supply o f
lorazepam API. In exchange for this exclusive license which would prevent any Mylan competitor
from using FIS’s lorazepam API, Mylan offered SST a percent ofMylan’s gross profits on lorazepam
tablets. Under this proposal, S ST would receive these profits even though Mylan would not purchase
from SST any lorazepam API. SST turned down Mylan’s proposed licensing arrangement. Had SST
accepted, none ofMylan’s competitors would have been able to use FIS lorazepam API to make or
sell lorazepam tablets in the United States.
34.

Sometime in the fall o f 1997, Mylan approached Abbott Laboratories, the

manufacturer ofTranxene, the brand name clorazepate product, which manufactured clorazepate API
for its own use and thus was a possible supplier o f clorazepate API for the generic clorazepate tablets
market. Mylan inquired about purchasing clorazepate API, even though before Mylan could use
A bbott’s product, it was required to supplement its AND A, which would take an average o f 18
months.
35.

Profarmaco signed the ten year exclusive agreements licensing the two DMFs to

Mylan on November 14, 1997. Through these agreements, Mylan obtained control over the supply
o f Profarmaco’s APIs for lorazepam and clorazepate in the United States, denying Mylan’s
competitors (particularly Gyma’s customers Watson and Purepac) access to these essential raw
materials. In 1997, Profarmaco. through Gyma, supplied over 90% o f the lorazepam API and 100%
o f the clorazepate API to generic manufacturers in the United States market. In separate agreements,
Mylan agreed to pay Gyma a percentage ofM ylan’s gross profits on the sale of lorazepam and
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clorazepate tablets as^ compensation for Gyma’s role in the negotiations leading to the exclusive
licensing agreements with Profarmaco.
36.

Without a source of supply, Watson and Purepac attempted to secure alternate API

suppliers. Recognizing that Mylan now had control over lorazepam API from Profarmaco, Purepac
even approached Mylan to obtain some lorazepam API on an emergency basis. Mylan refused to sell
this product to Purepac.
37.

Shortly after Mylan signed the ten year exclusive licensing agreements with

Profarmaco, S ST’s president met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with the Mylan vice president who has
responsibility for purchasing APIs. At this meeting, which occurred on or around November 20,
1997, SST explained to Mylan that it would not license FIS’s DMF for lorazepam API to Mylan, at
least in part out of concern that such an agreement could violate the antitrust laws. Nevertheless,
through the Pittsburgh meeting, or otherwise in the course of their exchanges o f information before
and after it, Mylan and SST conspired and reached an agreement to fix. raise or stabilize the prices
o f lorazepam API.
38.

OnJanuary 12. 1998, despite no significant increase in its costs, Mylan raised its price

o f clorazepate tablets to State Medicaid programs, wholesalers, retail pharmacy chains, and other
customers by amounts ranging from 1,900 percent to over 3,200 percent, depending on the bottle size
and strength. For example, a ¿00 count bottle of 7.5 mg clorazepate tablets increased in price from
SI 1.36 to $377.00. On March 3. 1998, despite no significant increase in its costs, Mylan raised its
price o f lorazepam tablets by amounts ranging from 1,900 percent to over 2,600 percent, depending
on the bottle size and strength. For example, a 500-count bottle o f 1 mg lorazepam tablets increased
in price from S7.30 to $191.50. The ultimate retail price to consumers was even higher. Mvlan’s
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competitors matched these price increases for lorazépam and clorazepate tablets. After the abovementioned price increases were effected, departments, bureaus, or agencies o f the governments o f
some States (or such States’ assignors) purchased lorazépam or clorazepate tablets at
supracompetitive prices from Mylan or its subsidiaries, including UDL Laboratories, Inc.
39.

Shortly after Mylan raised its price of lorazépam tablets, and despite no significant

increase in its costs, SST carried out its pan of the agreement by raising the price of FIS lorazépam
API by approximately 1,900 percent. SST sold FIS’s lorazépam API to Geneva -- one o f Mylan’s
competitors. Geneva has set its price for lorazépam tablets at approximately Mylan’s level.
40.

A sa result o f these substantial and unprecedented agreements and price increases for

lorazépam and clorazepate tablets, many purchasers, including pharmacies, hospitals, insurers,
managed care organizations, wholesalers, government agencies, patients, consumers and others, have
paid substantially higher prices. Moreover, some patients may have stopped taking lorazépam and
clorazepate tablets altogether, or been forced to reduce the quantity they take, because they cannot
afford them.
41.

As a result of these substantial and unprecedented price increases on lorazépam and

clorazepate tablets. Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco, Gyma and SST have profited, and continue to
profit, from their unlawful conduct, to the detriment of consumers.
IX.
LACK OF PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATION
*

42.

The exclusive licensing agreements, and Defendants’ other conduct intended to lock

up the supply o f lorazépam and clorazepate API, lack any legitimate business or procompetitive

justification.

Moreover, any justification that may exist does not outweigh the substantial
18

anticompetitive effects of Defendants’ conduct.
43.

The exclusive licensing agreements were not reasonably necessary to protect Mylan’s

supply of lorazepam and clorazepate API. Profarmaco never indicated that it was considering no
longer making either of these products. Even if Mylan had legitimate concerns about the supply o f
these APIs, like other generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, Mylan could have entered into a less
restrictive requirements contract which would have assured Mylan a source o f supply, but not denied
Mylan’s competitors access to the same source. Moreover, its attempt to obtain an exclusive
agreement with FIS would provide no assurances o f supply, given that Mylan could not use any FIS
lorazepam API for at least a year, due to FDA regulations.
X.
EFFECTS
44.

The acts and practices o f the Defendants as herein alleged have had the purpose or

effect, or the tendency or capacity, to restrain competition unreasonably and to injure competition
within each State and throughout the United States in the following ways, among others:
45.

Restraining competition in the markets for lorazepam and clorazepate APIs and

46.

Fixing, raising, stabilizing, or otherwise tampering with the prices o f lorazepam API;

47.

Raising the cost that pharmacies, hospitals, insurers, managed care organizations,

tablets:

wholesalers, government agencies, consumers, and others who pay for lorazepam and clorazepate
tablets:
48.

Depriving consumers of access to needed pharmaceuticals and thereby injuring their

health: and
49.

Depriving consumers of the benefits of competition among generic pharmaceutical

manufacturers and entry from new competitors.
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XI
INJURY
50.

As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct alleged above, the States

were not and are not able to purchase, or pay reimbursements for purchases of, lorazepam and
clorazepate at prices determined by free and open competition, and consequently have been injured
in their business and property in that, inter alia, they have paid more and continue to pay more for
lorazepam and clorazepate than they would have paid in a free and open competitive market. The
States cannot quantify at this time the precise amount of monetary harm which they have sustained,
but allege that such harm is substantial. A precise determination o f this amount will require discovery
from the books and records of the Defendants and third parties.
51.

As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct alleged above, consumers

in the Plaintiff States were not and are not able to purchase lorazepam and clorazepate at prices
determined by free and open competition, and consequently have been injured in their business or
property in that, inter alia, they have paid more and continue to pay more for lorazepam and
clorazepate than they would have paid in a free and open competitive market. The States cannot
quantify at this time the precise amount of monetary harm which their consumers have sustained, but
allege that such harm is substantial. A precise determination o f this amount will require discovery
from the books and records of the Defendants and third parties.
52.

As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct alleged above, the general

economies o f the States have sustained injury, and are threatened with further injury to their business
and property unless the Defendants are enjoined from their unlawful conduct.
53.

A sa direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct alleged above, the defendants

have unjustly profited through inflated profit margins and have thus far retained the illegally obtained
profits.
54.

Defendants’ unlawful conduct is continuing and will continue unless the injunctive and
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equitable relief request is granted. The States do not have an adequate remedy at law.
XII.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CONSPIRACY TO
MONOPOLIZE GENERIC LORAZEPAM TABLETS MARKET
55.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs l through 54.

56.

Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma conspired to act together to obtain

monopoly power for Mylan in the generic lorazépam tablets market in the United States in violation
o f Section 2 o f the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
57.

Mylan acted with a specific intent to monopolize, and to destroy competition in, the

generic lorazépam tablets market. Mylan devised and implemented a calculated campaign to raise
the price and profitability of lorazépam by locking up the supply o f lorazépam API, the most essential
ingredient for making lorazépam tablets. Each of the co-conspirators acted with the specific intent
that Mylan obtain monopoly power in the generic lorazépam tablets market, and through their profit
sharing arrangement and the resulting higher prices, the co-conspirators each have profited
significantly from their conspiracy to the detriment o f consumers.
58.

In furtherance of this conspiracy, these Defendants entered into agreements and profit

sharing arrangements whereby Mylan obtained the exclusive license to Profarmaco’s lorazépam API.
This license had the purpose and effect of denying, to Mylan’s competitors in the generic lorazépam
tablets market, the supply of an essential raw material. Also in furtherance o f this conspiracy, Mylan
—with the full knowledge and approval of Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma —sought to obtain the
exclusive right to the only other active supplier o f lorazépam API to generic manufacturers.
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XIII.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CONSPIRACY TO
MONOPOLIZE GENERIC CLORAZEPATE TABLETS MARKET
59.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 54.

60.

Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma conspired to act together to obtain

monopoly power for Mylan in the generic clorazepate tablets market in the United States in violation
o f Section 2 o f the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
61.

Mylan acted with a specific intent to monopolize, and to restrain and destroy

competition in, the generic clorazepate tablets market. Mylan devised and implemented a calculated
campaign to raise the price and profitability o f clorazepate by .locking up the supply o f clorazepate
.API, the most essential ingredient for making clorazepate tablets. Each o f the co-conspirators acted
with the specific intent that Mylan obtain monopoly power in the generic clorazepate tablets market,
and through their profit sharing arrangement and the resulting higher prices, the co-conspirators each
have profited significantly from their conspiracy to the detriment o f consumers.
62.

In furtherance of this conspiracy, these Defendants enteredinto agreements and profit

sharing arrangements whereby Mylan obtained the exclusive license to Profarmaco ’s clorazepate API.
This license had the purpose and effect of denying, to Mylan5s competitors in the generic clorazepate
tablets market, the supply of an essential raw material. Also in the furtherance of this conspiracy,
Mylan approached Abbott Laboratories —which manufactured clorazepate API for use in Abbott’s
branded clorazepate —to inquire about purchasing clorazepate API, even though FDA regulations
effectively precluded Mylan from using, for at least a year, any Abbott clorazepate API.
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XIV.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
AGREEMENT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE ON LORAZEPAM
63.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 54.

64.

Mylan’s exclusive licensing agreement with Cambrex and Profarmaco, pursuant to

which Mylan obtained the exclusive right to Profarmaco’s supply of lorazepam API, and Gyma’s
compliance with it, unreasonably restricts competition and constitutes an unreasonable restraint o f
trade in violation o f Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
65.

Under this licensing agreement, Mylan licensed, on a ten year exclusive basis,

Profarmaco’s lorazepam API. The purpose or effect of this agreement is to foreclose substantially
the supply o f lorazepam API to Mylan’s competitors, thereby restraining trade and competition in the
generic lorazepam tablets market and enabling Mylan to raise prices significantly.
66.
objective.

This agreement is not reasonably necessary to accomplish any procompetitive
Moreover, any justification that may exist does not outweigh the substantial

anticompetitive effect of Defendants’ conduct.
XV.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
AGREEMENT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE ON CLORAZEPATE
67.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 54.

68.

Mylan’s exclusive licensing agreement with Cambrex and Profarmaco, pursuant to

which Mylan obtained the exclusive right to Profarmaco’s supply of clorazepate API, and Gyma’s
compliance with it, unreasonably restricts competition and constitutes an unreasonable restraint of
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trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
69.

Under this licensing agreement, Mylan licensed, on a ten year exclusive basis,

Profarmaco’s clorazepate API. The purpose or effect o f this agreement is to foreclose substantially
the supply o f clorazepate API to Mylan’s competitors, thereby restraining trade and competition in
the generic clorazepate tablets market and enabling Mylan to raise prices significantly.
70.
objective.

This agreement is not reasonably necessary to accomplish any procompetitive
Moreover, any justification that may exist does not outweigh the substantial

anticompetitive effect of Defendants’ conduct.
XVI.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
MONOPOLIZATION OF GENERIC LORAZEPAM TABLETS MARKET
71.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 54.

12.

Mylan obtained monopoly power in the generic lorazepam tablets market in violation

of Section 2 o f the Sherman A ct. 15 U. S.C. § 2. Using this monopoly power, Mylan raised the price
of generic lorazepam tablets by amounts ranging from 1,900 percent to over 2,600 percent,
depending on the bottle size and strength.
73.

Mylan willfully acquired its monopoly power by entering into an exclusive licensing

agreement for Profarmaco ’s lorazepam API. This exclusive license provided Mylan complete control
over Profarmaco’s supply of lorazepam API in the United States market, which enabled Mylan to
deny its actual or potential competitors access to this essential ingredient for producing generic
lorazepam tablets and significantly raise prices.
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XVII.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF ~ ATTEMPTED
MONOPOLIZATION OF GENERIC LORAZEPAM TABLETS MARKET
74.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs l through 54.

75.

Mylan acted with a specific intent to monopolize, and to destroy competition in, the

generic lorazepam tablets market, in violation o f Section 2 o f the Sherman Act, 15U.S.C. §2. Mylan
devised and implemented a calculated campaign to raise the price and profitability o f lorazepam by
locking up the supply o f lorazepam API, the most essential ingredient for making generic lorazepam
tablets.
76.

Mylan has willfully engaged in a course of exclusionary conduct in order to obtain a

monopoly in the generic lorazepam tablets market, including, inter alia: (1) entering into an exclusive
licensing agreement for Profarmaco’s lorazepam API; and (2) approaching SST — the only other
active distributor o f lorazepam API to generic manufacturers in the United States — proposing a
similar 'licensing arrangement for FIS’s lorazepam API, even though Mylan could not even use any
of FIS's lorazepam API because of FDA regulations.
77.

At the time Mylan engaged in these acts, it had a dangerous probability o f succeeding

in controlling the supply of lorazepam API and excluding its competitors. Mylan, by obtaining the
exclusive licensing agreement with Cambrex. Profarmaco, and Gyma, prevented certain competitors
from obtaining lorazepam API. enabling Mylan to significantly raise prices. Had SST agreed to
Mylan's proposal, it would have denied lorazepam API to other competitors and potential
competitors, allowing Mylan to acquire or maintain monopoly power in the generic lorazepam tablets
market.
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XVIII.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
MONOPOLIZATION OF GENERIC CLORAZEPATE TABLETS MARKET
78.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 54 through.

79.

Mylan possessed monopoly power in the generic clorazepate tablets market in

violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. Using this monopoly power, Mylan raised
the price of generic lorazepam tablets by amounts ranging from 1,900 percent to over 3,200 percent,
depending on the bottle size and strength.
80.

Mylan willfully acquired its monopoly power by entering into an exclusive licensing

agreement for Profarmaco’s clorazepate API. This exclusive license provided Mylan with complete
control over Profarmaco’s supply of clorazepate API in the United States market, which enabled
Mylan to deny its actual or potential competitors access to this essential ingredient for producing
generic clorazepate tablets and significantly raise prices.
«A.

XIX.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION OF GENERIC CLORAZEPATE TABLETS MARKET
81.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 54.

82.

Mylan acted with a specific intent to monopolize, and to destroy competition in, the

generic clorazepate tablets market in violation of Section 2 o f the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
Mylan devised and implemented a calculated campaign to raise the price and profitability of
clorazepate by locking up the supply o f clorazepate API, the most essential ingredient for making
clorazepate tablets.
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83.

Mylan has willfully engaged in a course o f exclusionary conduct in order to obtain a

monopoly in the generic lorazepam tablets market, including, inter alia, entering into an exclusive
licensing agreement for Profarmaco’s clorazepate API.
84

At the time Mylan engaged in these acts, it had a dangerous probability o f succeeding

in controlling the supply of clorazepate API and excluding its competitors. Mylan, by obtaining the
exclusive licensing agreement with Cambrex, Profarmaco and Gyma, prevented certain competitors
from obtaining clorazepate API, enabling Mylan to significantly raise prices.
XX.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
PRICE FIXING AGREEMENT ON LORAZEPAM API
85.

The States reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 54.

86.

Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco, Gyma, and SST conspired to fix, raise, or stabilize the

prices oflorazepam API, a per se violation of Section 1 o f the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
87.

In furtherance of this conspiracy, Mylan met with S ST in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on

or around November 20, 1997. At this meeting, or otherwise in the course o f their exchanges of
information before and after it, Mylan and SST conspired and reached ail agreement to fix, raise, or
stabilize the price oflorazepam API. Among other things, SST agreed to raise the price oflorazepam
.API to its customers.
38.

In accordance with this agreement, Mylan substantially raised the price o f its

lorazepam tablets, and by virtue of its profit sharing arrangement with Cambrex, Profarmaco. and
Gyma. substantially raised the effective price of Profarmaco’s lorazepam API. Also in accordance
with this agreement, SST substantially raised the price o f its lorazepam API. By raising the price of
its lorazepam API, SST ensured that its customers would follow Mylan’s pricing for generic
lorazepam tablets. This agreement further ensured Mylan’s ability to promote the success of its
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unlawful scheme and maintain supracompetitive prices for lorazepam.
XXI.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW CLAIMS
89.

Plaintiff State of Alaska repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
90.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f the Alaska

Monopolies and Restraint o f Trade Act, AS 45.50.562 et seq., and the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Act, AS 45.50.471 et seq.
91.

Plaintiff State of Arkansas repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
92.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f Arkansas law

concerning prohibited practices in restraint of trade and monopolies generally, found at Ark. Code
Ann. sec. 4-75-301 et seq. and the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act found at Ark.
Code Ann. sec. 4-88-101 et seq.
93.

Plaintiff State of California repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
94.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f the Cartwright Act,

California Business and Professions Code Sections 16700 et seq., and the California Unfair
Competition Act, California Business and Professions Code Sections 17200 et seq.
95.

Plaintiff State of Colorado repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
96.

The aforementioned practices o f Defendants were in violation o f the Colorado

Antitrust Act o f 1992, §§ 6-4-104 and 6-4-105, C.R.S. (1998).
97.

Plaintiff State of Connecticut repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
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98.

The aforementioned practices o f Defendants Were in violation o f the Connecticut

Antitrust Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 35-24 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 42-110a, et seq. The State o f Connecticut is entitled to redress
pursuant to §§ 35-32, 35-34, 35-38, 42-110m and 42-1 lOo o f the Connecticut General Statutes.
99.

PlaintifFDistrict of Columbia repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
100.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f the District o f

Columbia Antitrust Act o f 1980, D.C. Code 28-4501 et seq. (1996 Rpl.).
101.

Plaintiff State of Florida repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
102.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f Chapter 542, Florida

Statutes (the Florida Antitrust Act o f 1980), and Chapter 501, Part H, Florida Statutes (the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act). Florida Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth brings
this action in part as an “enforcing authority” designated under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act (Chapter 501, Part II, Florida Statutes, and particularly sections 501.207 and
501.203(2)) on behalf o f all “consumers” (as defined in section 501.203(7), Florida Statutes) who
purchase or purchased lorazepam or clorazepate at supracompetitive prices either directly from
Defendants or indirectly through others in the chain o f distribution. The violations o f section
501.204, Florida Statutes, herein alleged have occurred in or affected, and are occurring in or
affecting, more than one judicial circuit o f the State o f Florida.
103.

Plaintiff State of Idaho repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
104.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation of the Idaho Antitrust

Law, Idaho Code §§ 48-101 et seq., and were unconscionable acts or practices in violation of Idaho
Code § 48-603(18) of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The State of Idaho is entitled to redress
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pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 48-103, 48-112, 48-114, 48-606, and 48-607, Idaho Code. The
Attorney General finds that the purposes of title 48, chapter 6, Idaho Code, will be substantially and
materially impaired by delay in instituting this action.
105.

Plaintiff State of Illinois repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
106.

The aforementioned practices by the Defendants were in violation o f the Illinois -

Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/3.
107.

Plaintiff State of Iowa repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
108.

The aforementioned practices by the Defendants were in violation o f the Iowa

Competition Law, Iowa Code sections 553.4 and'553.5.
109.

Plaintiff Commonwealth o f Kentucky repeats and realleges each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
110.

The aforementioned practices by the Defendants were in violation o f Kentucky

Revised Statutes (KRS) 367.175, and the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, KRS 367.110 etseq.
111.

Pursuant to KRS 367.110 et seq. the Commonwealth o f Kentucky brings this action

for three times the amount of damages sustained by the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its natural
person citizens, together with costs and attorneys fees, civil penalties and all available equitable relief,
including injunctive relief and restitution and disgorgement.
112.

Plaintiff State of Louisiana repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
113.

The aforementioned practices of Defendants were in violation o f the Louisiana

Monopolies Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 51:121, et seq. and the Louisiana Unfair
Trade and Consumer Protection Act, La. R. S. 51:1401, et seq. The State o f Louisiana is entitled to
redress pursuant to La. R.S. 51:136-139 and La. R.S. 51:1404B, La. R.S. 51:1407-1409.
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114.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 137andl38, andLa. R.S. 51:1404B, 1408-1409 and 1414, and

acting under the Attorney General’s .specific authority to bring all Louisiana Monopolies Act actions
and any unfair trade action, the State of Louisiana brings this action to recover three times the
damages suffered by Louisiana consumers and/or state agencies as a result to Defendants’ illegal,
anticompetitive conduct.
115.

The State o f Louisiana also seeks statutory penalties, costs, disbursements and

attorneys fees from Defendants, as well as all available injunctive relief pursuant to La. R. S. 122-123,
129, 130, 138 and 139, La. R.S. 51:1404B, 1408, 1409 and 1414.
116.

Plaintiff State of Maine repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
117.

The aforementioned practices by Defendant were in violation o f Maine Revised

Statutes Annotated, 10M.R.S.A. § \\0 \e ts e q ., and Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S. A.
§ 205-A et seq.
118.

Plaintiff State of Maryland repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 -ghth the same force and effect as if here set forth in full. .
119.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were, and are in violation of the

Maryland Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-201 et seq.
120.

Plaintiff State of Michigan repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
121.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were, and are, in violation of the

Michigan Antitrust Reform Act MCL 445.771 et seq. and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act
MCL 445.901 et seq. The State of Michigan is entitled to redress pursuant to MCL 445.777. MCL
445.778 and MCL 445.901 et seq.
122.

Plaintiff State of Minnesota repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
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123.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation of the Minnesota

antitrust law o f 1971, Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.49-325D.66 (1998).
124.

The State of Minnesota is entitled to relief pursuant to Minn. Stat. §8.31; Minn. Stat.

§§ 325D.49-325D.66; and, its authority to bring actions as parens patriae on behalf o f Minnesota
consumers.
125.

Plaintiff State of Missouri repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
126.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f the Missouri

Antitrust Law, §§416.031.1, 416.031.2, and 416.031.3, Revised Statutes ofM issouri 1994, and in
violation of the Merchandising Practices Act, §407.020, Revised Statutes ofM issouri 1994.
127.

Plaintiff State o f N^w Mexico repeats and realleges each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full herein.
128.

Part of the trade or commerce affected by the aforementioned practices was within

New Mexico.
129.

The aforementioned practices of Defendants were in violation o f the New Mexico

Antitrust Act, N.M.. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1 to § 57-1-15 (1998).
130.

Plaintiff State of New York repeats and realleges each ancLevery allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
131.

Defendants’ practices violate New York General Business Law §§ 340-347, and also

constitute fraudulent or illegal acts under New York Exec. Law § 63(12).
132.

Plaintiff State of North Carolina repeats and realleges each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
133.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f N.C. Gen.

Stat. §§ 75-1, -1.1, -2 and -2.1, and were in knowing violation o f law.
134.

Plaintiff State of Ohio repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in
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paragraphs 1 through-88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
135.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f Ohio's antitrust law,

the Ohio Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1331.01 et seq., Ohio Rev. Code § 109.81, and the
common law o f Ohio.
136.

Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code §§ 109.81, 1331.03, 1331.08 and 1331.11, the State of

Ohio brings this action for two times the amount of damages sustained by the State and its natural
person citizens, together with costs and attorney fees, civil penalties, and all other available equitable
relief, including injunctive relief and restitution and disgorgement.
137.

Plaintiff State of Oklahoma repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
138.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f 79 Okla. Stat. §201-

212 (Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act) and 15 Okla. Stat. § 751 etseq. (Oklahoma Consumer
Protection Act).
139.

Plaintiff State of Oregon repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
140.

The aforementioned practices by the Defendants were in violation of ORS 646.725

and ORS 646.730 of the Oregon .Antitrust Act, ORS 646.705, et seq.
141.

The State o f Oregon brings this action for civil penalties and all available equitable

relief, including injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement, together with reimbursement o f
reasonable attorneys fees, expens' fees, and costs from Defendants, pursuant to ORS 646.760,
646.770, 646.775, and the authority under Oregon common law.
142.

Plaintiff State of South Carolina repeats and realleges each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
143.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f South Carolina Code

o f Laws §§ 39-5-10, etseq. The State of South Carolina is entitled to redress pursuant to §§ 39-5-50

and 39-5-110 o f the South Carolina General Statutes.
144.

Plaintiff State of South Dakota repeats and realleges each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
145.

-

The aforementioned practices of Defendants were in violation o f South Dakota

antitrust law SDCL ch. 37-1. The State of South Dakota and persons it represents are entitled to
redress pursuant to SDCL 37-1-14.2, 14.3, 32 and 33.
146.

Plaintiff State of Tennessee repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
147.

The aforementioned practices of Defendants were in violation o f Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 47-25-101 et seq. The State o f Tennessee is entitled to damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 47-25-106.
148.

The State ofTennessee also brings this action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §8-6-109

to recover damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-106 suffered by Tennessee governmental
entities as a result of the Defendants’ illegal and anticompetitive acts. The State ofTennessee also
seeks penalties, costs, disbursements and attorney fees from Defendants, together with any and all
injunctive relief to which the State ofTennessee may be entitled.
149.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-

18-101 etseq. (the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act o f 1977). The State ofTennessee is entitled
to recover three (3) times the damages suffered as a result o f Defendants’ illegal and anticompetitive
actions, together with a civil penalty of $1,000.00 for each violation of the Act.
150.

Acting under the authority of the Attorney General and Reporter pursuant to Tenn.

Code Ann. § 47-18-108, the State ofTennessee brings this action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18101 et seq. (the Tennessee Consumer protection Act) to recover three (3) times the damages pursuant
to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-106 suffered by Tennessee consumers as a result o f the Defendants’
illegal and anticompetitive actions together with a civil penalty o f $1,000.00 for each violation of the
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Act.
151.

The State o f Tennessee also brings this action pursuant to Term. Code Ann. §§ 8-6-

109 and 47rl8-101 etseq. (the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act) to recover three (3) times the
damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-106 et seq. suffered by Tennessee governmental
entities as a result of the Defendants’ illegal and anticompetitive acts together with a civil penalty o f
S 1,000.00 for each violation of the Act.

The State of Tennessee also seeks penalties, costs,

disbursements and attorney fees from Defendants, together with any and all injunctive relief to which
the State of Tennessee may be entitled.
152.

Plaintiff State o f Texas repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein:
.

153.

The aforementioned practices o f Defendants were in violation o f T exas Business and

Commerce Code, §15.05 (a), (b). The State of Texas is entitled to redress pursuant to §15.20(a),
(b) o f the Texas Business and Commerce Code.
154.

Plaintiff State of Utah repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
155.

The aforementioned practices of Defendants were in violation o f the Utah Antitrust

Act, Utah Code Ann. §-§ 76-10-911 et seq.
156.

The State o f Utah seeks injunctive relief, a civil penalty o f $500,000 per violation,

costs o f suit, and reasonable attorneys fees as provided by the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-10-918 and 76-10-919 (3).
157.

The State of Utah also brings this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-14 on

behalf o f the State of Utah as a purchaser o f pharmaceuticals and as parens patriae on behalf of Utah
purchasers for violations of the Utah Unfair Trade Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-3 (5), (6).
The State o f Utah seeks to recover three times the damages suffered by Utah governmental entities
and Utah consumers as a result of Defendants’ illegal, anticompetitive conduct. In addition to the
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treble damages, the State ofUtah seeks all available injunctive relief under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-14
and its costs.
158.

Plaintiff State of Vermont repeats each and every allegation contained in paragraphs

1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
159.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f the Vermont

Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. § 2453.
160.

Pursuant to 9 V.S.A. §§ 2458 and 2461, and acting under the Vermont Attorney

General's authority to pursue actions as parens patriae, the State o f Vermont brings this action to
recover three times the damages suffered by Vermont consumers as a result o f Defendants' illegal,
anticompetitive conduct.
161.

The State o f Vermont also brings this action pursuant to 9 V.S.A. §§ 2458 and 2461,

to recover three times the damages sustained by the State, together with costs and attorneys fees, civil
penalties, and all other available equitable relief, including injunctive relief, restitution and
*

disgorgement.
162.

PlaintiffState.ofW ashington rep eats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88.
163.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were and are in violation o f Wash. Rev.

Code 19.86.010 et seq.
164.

Plaintiff State of West Virginia repeats and realleges each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
165.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f the West Virginia

.Antitrust Act, W. Va. Code § 47-18-1 et seq., and in violation o f the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act, W. Va. Code § 46A-1-101 et seq.
166.

Plaintiff State of Wisconsin repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained

in paragraphs 1 through 88 with the same force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
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167.

The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation o f the Wisconsin Trusts

and Monopolies Act, Wis. Stats. § 133.03.
XXII.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
168.

The States demand trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 38(b) o f the Federal Rules o f Civil

Procedure, o f all issues triable of right by jury.
XXIII.

PRAYERFORRELIEF
WHEREFORE, the States pray that the Court:
1.

Adjudge and decree that Defendants have engaged in conduct in violation o f Sections

1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2;
2.

Adjudge and decree that Defendants have engaged in conduct in violation o f the state

statutes enumerated in Paragraphs 89 through 167;
3.

Enjoin and restrain, pursuant to state and federal law, the Defendants, their affiliates,

assignees, subsidiaries, successors and transferees, and the officers, directors, partners, agents and
employees thereof, and all other persons acting or claiming to act on their behalf or in concert with
them, from continuing, maintaining or renewing the contracts, combinations or conspiracies alleged
herein, or from engaging in any other contract, combination or conspiracy having a similar purpose
or effect, and from adopting or following any practice, plan, program or device having a similar
purpose or effect;
4.

Declare void and unenforceable the exclusive agreements entered into by Defendants

Mylan. Cambrex, Profarmaco and Gyma dated November 14, 1997;
5.

Enter judgment for the States and award all other available equitable relief, including,

but not limited to, restitution and disgorgement, as the Court finds necessary to redress Defendants’
violations o f State and federal law;
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6.

Award each State the costs of this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, and,

where applicable expert fees;
7.

Enter judgment for the States for three (3) times the amount o f damages sustained hy

the States (as direct purchasers or assignees of direct purchasers) as allowed by federal law, together
with the costs of this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees;
8.

Enter judgment for the States of Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,

Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota,
T ennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin; and the Commonwealth of Kentucky for three
(3) times the amount o f damages sustained by the States, (including damages for medical
reimbursement programs) and the entities they represent, or on whose behalf this suit is brought, as
allowed by State law, together with the costs o f this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees;
9.

Enter judgment for the States o f Alaska, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,

Michigan, M innesota New Mexico, New York, South D akota Tennessee, Utah, Vermont. West
Virginia Wisconsin, the Commonwealth ofKentucky; and the District o f Columbia for three (3) times
the amount o f damages sustained by the persons they represent, or on whose behalf this suit is
brought, as allowed by state law, together with the costs o f this action, including reasonable
attorneys’ fees;
10.

Enter judgment for the States o f Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Oklahoma

T ennessee and Washington, and for the District o f Columbia for the damages sustained by the States
and the District o f Columbia (including damages for medical reimbursement programs) and the
entities they represent, or on whose behalf this suit is brought, as allowed by State law, together with
the costs o f this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, as allowed by State law;
11.

Enter judgment for the States o f Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Missouri, Oklahoma and

Tennessee for the damages sustained by the persons they represent, or on whose behalf this suit is
brought, as allowed by state law, together with the costs o f this action, including reasonable
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attorneys’ fees;
12.

Enter judgment for the State of Ohio for two (2) times the amount o f damages

sustained by the State and the persons it represents as allowed by state law, together with costs and
reasonable attorneys’ fees, and all other equitable relief, including injunctive relief, restitution and
disgorgement;
13.

Enter judgment for the Plaintiff States o f Maine and South Carolina under state law,

for damages as may be necessary to restore any person or entity who has suffered any ascertainable
loss by reason o f the use or employment o f defendants’ unlawful methods, acts or practices and any
monies which may have been acquired by means o f the unlawful practices o f the defendants, together
with the costs o f this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
14.

Enterjudgment for the States o f Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,

Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin; and the Commonwealth o f Kentucky
against the Defendants for the maximum civil penalties allowable under the laws o f each State;
15.

Enter judgment for the State o f Tennessee, its governmental entities and for

consumers damaged as a result of Defendants’ actions denying the Defendants and each of them the
right to do and be prohibited from doing business in the State o f Tennessee;
16.

Declare that pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-104(b), the Defendants and each

o f them be denied the right to do and be prohibited from doing business in the State o f Tennessee;
17.

Enterjudgment pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 133.14 for the State o f Wisconsin and its

consumers (1) declaring void any and all contracts or agreements founded upon, the result of,
growing out of, or connected with, the violations o f the Wisconsin.Trusts and Monopolies Act, Wis.
Stat. § 133.03, either directly or indirectly; and, (2) for all payments made by the State of Wisconsin
and its consumers which relate, directly or indirectly, to such contracts or agreements;
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18.

Grant such other and further relief, including all other available equitable relief, as the

case may require and the Court may deem just and proper to redress Defendants’ violations o f State
and federal law:

Respecttiilly submitted this

day o f

I

1999

Betty D. Montgomery
Attorney General
State o f Ohio
h

BY:

I

A t i-t ' /--/ ¿-----------¿ t i t , ,!
Raj Malik
Assistant Attorney General
/ • \ j Ll/ ìL-t- c
uc< . .____
Doreen Johnson
Chief, Antitrust Section
Mitchell L. Gentile
Senior Attorney
140 East Town Street, 1st Floor
Columbus. Ohio 43215
id 14) 466-4328
A.

Counsel for Ohio
and on behalf of the Plaintiff States
(listed below)
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Plaintiff States:
STATE of ALASKA
BRUCE M. BOTELHO
Attorney General
Daveed A. Schwartz
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection/Antitrust Unit
1031 W. Fourth Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
(907) 269-5100

STATE of ARKANSAS
MARKPRYOR
Attorney General
Teresa Brown
Assistant Attorney General
200 Tower Building
323 Center Street
Little Rock, A R 72201-2601
(501)682-6150

STATE of CALIFORNIA
BELL LOCKYER
Attorney General
Roderick E. Walston
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Barbara M. M otz
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Natalie S. Manzo
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring St., Suite 5000
Los Angeles, California 90013
(213) 897-2704

STATE of COLORADO
KEN SALAZAR
Attorney General
Jan Michael Zavislan
First Assistant Attorney General
Maria E. Berkenkotter
Assistant Attorney General
1525 Sherman Street, 5th Floor
Denver. CO 80203
(303) 866-5079

STATE of CONNECTICUT
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
Attorney General
Steven M. Rutstein
Department Head
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Department
Arnold B. Feigin
Assistant Attorney General
110 Sherman Street
Hartford, CT 06105
(860) 808-5400

DISTRICT of COLUMBIA
JOHN M. FERREN
Corporation Counsel
Robert R. Rigsby
Deputy Corporation Counsel
Enforcement Division
Charlotte W. Parker
Director, Civil Division
Bennett RushkofF
Special Counsel
Stuart Cameron
Assistant Corporation Counsel
441 4th Street, N.W., Suite 6N72
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 727-6240

STATE of FLORIDA
ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH
Attorney General
Patricia A. Conners
Chief, Antitrust Section
Kimberly L. King
Peter H. Williams
Assistant Attorneys General
PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
(850)414-3600
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STATE of IDAHO
ALAN G. LANCE
Attorney General
Brett T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
700 W. Jefferson Street, Room 210
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208)334-2424

STATE of ILLINOIS
JAMES E. RYAN
Attorney General
Christine H. Rosso
Chief, Antitrust Bureau
Don R. Sampen
•
Assistant Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, EL 60601
(312)814-5610

STATE of IOWA
THOMAS J. MILLER
Attorney General
William L. Brauch
Special Assistant Attorney General
John F. Dwyer
Attorney, Iowa Department of Justice
310 Maple Street
Des Moines, IA 50319
(515) 281-8414

COMMONWEALTH of KENTUCKY
ALBERT BENJAMIN CHANDLER III
Attorney General
David Vandeventer
Assistant Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40602-2000
(502)696-5389

STATE of LOUISIANA
RICHARD P. IEYOUB
Attorney General
Jane Bishop Johnson
Assistant Attorney General
301 Main Street, Suite 1250
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(504) 342-2754

STATE of MAINE
ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General
Stephen L. Wessler
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Public Protection Division
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
(207) 626-8845

STATE OF MARYLAND
J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR.
Attorney General
Ellen S. Cooper
Chief, Antitrust Division
Meredvth Smith Andrus
.Assistant Attorney General
200 St. Paul Street •
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 576-6470

STATE of MICHIGAN
JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM
Attorney General
Paul Novak
.Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
.Antitrust and Franchise Section
670 G. Mennen Williams Building
525 W. Ottawa Street
P. O. Box 30213
Lansing, MI 48913
(517)373-7117

*€

STATE of MINNESOTA
MIKE HATCH
Attorney General
.Ann Beimdiek Kinsella
Peter B. Hoffenning
Assistant Attorneys General
Antitrust and Commerce Division
N.C.L. Tower, Suite 1200
445 Minnesota Street
St. Paul, MN 55101
(651)296-7575

STATE of MISSOURI
JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON
Attorney General
Douglas M. Ommen, Chief Counsel
Michael J. Delaney, Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
111 North Seventh Street
Suite 204
St. Louis, MO 63101
(314) 340-6816

STATE of NEW MEXICO
PATRICIA A. MADRID
Attorney General
Susan White
Chief. .Antitrust Unit
Michael P. Fricke
Assistant Attorney General
6301 Indian School Road NE.. Suite 400
.Albuquerque, NM 87110
(505) 841-8098
STATE of N EW Y O R K
ELIOT SPITZER
Attorney General
Harry First
Chief, Antitrust Bureau
Robert L. Hubbard
Susan E. Raitt
Assistant Attorneys General
120 Broadway, Suite 26-01
New York, NY 10271
(212) 416-6163
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STATE of NORTH CAROLINA
MICHAEL F. EASLEY
Attorney General
K.D. Sturgis
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection/Antitrust Section
114 W. Edenton Street
P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602-0629
(919) 716-6000
STATE of OHIO
BETTY D. MONTGOMERY
Attorney General
Doreen Johnson
Chief, Antitrust Section
Raj Malik
Assistant Attorney General
Mitchell L. Gentile
Senior Attorney
140 East Town Street, 1st Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 466-4328

STATE of OKLAHOMA'
YV.A. DREW EDMONDSON
Attorney General
Steven J. Leippert
Assistant Attorney General
4545 N. Lincoln Boulevard
Suite 260
Oklahoma City, OK 73105
(405) 522-3082

STATE of OREGON
HARDY MYERS
Attorney General
.Andrew E. Aubertine
Assistant Attorney General
Department o f Justice
Justice Building
1162 Court Street NE, Suite 100
Salem, OR 97310
(503) 378-4732

COMMONWEALTH of PENNSYLVANIA
D. MICHAEL FISHER
Attorney General
James A. Donahue III
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Antitrust Section
Deneice Covert Zeve
Deputy Attorney General
14th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
(717) 787-4530

STATE of SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLES M. CONDON
Attorney General
C. Havird Jones, Jr.
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Rembert C. Dennis Building
1000 Assembly Street, Suite 501
Columbia, SC 29211-1549
(803 ) 734-3970
STATE of SO U TH DAKOTA
MARKBARNETT
Attorney General
Jeffrey P. Hallem
Assistant Attorney General
500 East Capitol
Pierre. SD 57501-5070
(605) 773-3215
STATE of TENNESSEE
PAUL G. SUMMERS
o
Attorney General and Reporter
Dennis J. Garvey
Deputy Attorney General
Antitrust Division
J. Patrick Riceci
Assistant Attorney General
425 5th Avenue North
Nashville. TN 37243
(615)532-8986
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STATE of TEXAS
JOHN CORNYN
Attorney General
Mark Tobey
Chief, Antitrust Section
Kelly Garcia
Assistant Attorney General
300 W. 15th Street, 9th Floor
P. O. Box 12548
Austin, TX 78711-2548
(512) 463-4012

STATE of UTAH
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Wayne Klein
Division Chief
Antitrust Section
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
(801)366-0358

STATE of VERMONT
WILLIAM H. SORRELL
Attorney General
Julie Briil
Rebecca Ellis
Assistant Attorneys General
.Antitrust and Consumer Fraud Unit
109 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05609-1001
(802)828-5507

STATE of WASHINGTON
CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
Attorney General
Jon P. Ferguson
Senior Counsel
Chief, Antitrust Section
Marta Lowy
Assistant Attorney General
.Antitrust Section
900 Fourth Avenue. Suite 2000
Seattle. WA 98164-1012
(206) 464-7744

STATE of WEST VIRGINIA
DARRELL V. McGRAW, JR.
Attorney General
Jill L. Miles
Deputy Attorney General
Douglas L. Davis
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division
812 Quarrier Street
Charleston, WV 25301
(304) 558-8986
STATE of WISCONSIN
JAMES E. DOYLE
Attorney General
Kevin J. O’Connor
Assistant Attorney General
123 West Washington Avenue
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53703-7857
(608) 266-8986
(AG179891)
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